The impact of demographic change on policy indicators and reforms by De Blander, R. et al.
 
DISCUSSION PAPER 25 
 
 
 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF 
 DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE  
ON POLICY INDICATORS  
AND REFORMS 
 
REMBERT DE BLANDER 
INGRID SCHOCKAERT 
ANDRÉ DECOSTER 
PATRICK DEBOOSERE 
 
September 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
d
is
c
u
s
s
io
n
 p
a
p
e
r
 
 
 F L E M O S I  D I S C U S S I O N  P A P E R  D P 2 5 
T H E  I M P A C T  O F  D E M O G R A P H I C  C H A N G E  O N  P O L I C Y  I N D I C A T O R S  A N D  R E F O R M S  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper was written as part of the SBO-project “FLEMOSI: A tool for ex ante evaluation of socio-economic policies 
in Flanders”, funded by IWT Flanders. The project intends to build ‘FLEmish MOdels of SImulation’ and is joint work 
of the Centre for Economic Studies (CES) of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven – the Centre for Social Policy (CSB) 
of the Universiteit Antwerpen– the Interface Demography of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel – the Centre de Recherche 
en Économie Publique et de la population (CREPP) of the Université de Liege and the Institute for Social and Economic 
Research (Microsimulation Unit) of the University of Essex.  
For more information on the project, see www.flemosi.be. 
 F L E M O S I  D I S C U S S I O N  P A P E R  D P 2 5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE  
ON POLICY INDICATORS AND REFORMS 
 
 
 
REMBERT DE BLANDER (*) 
INGRID SCHOCKAERT (§)  
ANDRÉ DECOSTER (*) 
PATRICK DEBOOSERE (§) 
 
September 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: In this paper, we project demographic changes for the next twenty years, by means of 
multi-state population projections (Lipro-projections) by age, sex and household position on 
the one hand and by age, sex and educational attainment on the other. On the basis of these 
projections we obtain forecasted household weights by calibration. The future population is 
approximated by static re-weighting of the EU-SILC 2008 dataset, which is a representative 
sample of the population in the base year. We assume a modest real growth rate of 1%.  
We investigate the budgetary and distributional effects of the obtained demographic and 
economic evolution. The importance of demographic change is further illustrated by its 
influence on the effects of some policy reforms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
§ Interface Demography, Vrije Universiteit Brussel 
The Impact of Demographic Change
on Policy Indicators and Reforms
Rembert De Blander, Ingrid Schockaert, André Decoster, Patrick Deboosere
September 2013
Abstract
In this paper, we project demographic changes for the next twenty years, by means of
multi-state population projections (Lipro-projections) by age, sex and household position
on the one hand and by age, sex and educational attainment on the other. On the basis
of these projections we obtain forecasted household weights by calibration. The future
population is approximated by static re-weighting of the EU-SILC 2008 dataset, which
is a representative sample of the population in the base year. We assume a modest real
growth rate of 1%. We investigate the budgetary and distributional effects of the obtained
demographic and economic evolution. The importance of demographic change is further
illustrated by its influence on the effects of some policy reforms.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we investigate the expected evolution of Flanders´ income distribution over
the next twenty years. While such evolution was traditionally mainly attributed to economic
variables, such as wages, income, consumption, and wealth (Heathcote et al., 2010), in this paper
we focus on the role of population change. Recently, the importance of a clear understanding of
demographic change in relation to inequality has repeatedly been stressed (Blank, 1995, 2011;
Burtless, 1999; Western et al., 2008; Chen and Föster, 2011). The increase of single-headed
households and especially single parenting, and the rise of female educational attainment and
labour market participation undoubtedly have contributed to this shift in research focus (Peichl
et al., 2012; Burtless, 1999). Less able to pool income resources, a rise in the prevalence of single
headed households is often found to trigger an increase in inequality (Kollmeyer, 2012). The
rise in educational attainment and female labour force participation is also found to increase
inequality as double-income households are concentrated at the top of the income distribution
(Esping-Andersen, 2007).
In addition, this paper investigates interactions between demographic evolution and changes
in the tax-benefit system. First, we look at the effects of population and economic change on
the public revenues and expenditures. The ageing of the population raises concern about
the sustainability of our social security system as it alters the population’s dependency ratio.
1
DP 25 Demographic Change and Policy Indicators
Parallel to ageing, however, also the household structure and education of the population is
modified. The effects of the latter processes are much less known. Secondly, by means of a
simulation of a child benefit reform proposal, recently advanced by different political parties,
we analyse the influence of population change on the potential long term policy outcomes. In
contrast to static simulation models that estimate the immediate effect of policy measures, we
show the influence under changing demographic and economic conditions.
We thus join a strand of recent research aiming at quantifying the role of demographic
change on the increase in inequality (Peichl et al., 2012), breaking down changes in inequality
and poverty indices into changes in tax-benefit system, gross wage change contributions and
shifts in demographic composition (Bargain and Callan, 2010). Furthermore, to disentangle the
impact of population on the one hand and economic change on the other, we use decomposition
methods. For a discrete co-variate, two different methods can be used (Handcock and Morris,
1999; Peichl et al., 2012). The first is an exact decomposition of the distributional change by
co-variate subgroups (Shorrocks, 1980, 1984), comparing two (income) distributions (at two
points in time, t0 and t1, say) separately for, for example, each educational level. The second
method, which is also valid for continuous co-variates such as age, involves the construction of
a counter-factual distribution or index. This involves reweighting the sample at t0 such that
the distribution of education levels (or ages) becomes identical to the sample at t1. Comparison
of the counter-factual with the distribution at t0 reveals the effect of changing education, while
the difference between counter-factual and the distribution at t1 is a residual effect. Applied to
the mean of a distribution, the second method is known as the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition.
In the context of distributional analysis it has been applied by DiNardo et al. (1996), Hyslop
and Maré (2005), Handcock and Morris (1998), to name but a few. In this paper, we will
mainly apply the second method.
In contrast to former studies, we make this decomposition prospectively. From a policy point
of view, this is important. For social policy aiming at guiding societal evolution to go beyond ad
hoc answers to structural changes, it needs to be informed how future population characteristics
affect inequality. In addition, this prospective view can re-mediate some of the difficulties
faced by retrospective research due to differences in contextual factors such as the time period
and the welfare systems (Esping-Andersen, 2007). Building on hypothetical scenarios about
economic growth and population forecasts, we isolate our analysis from temporal and contextual
influences and gain at least partial control over interactions with non observed variables.
The prospective nature of our endeavour firmly roots it in the micro-simulation tradition.
A microsimulation model (MSM ) is a computer program that simulates aggregate and distribu-
tional effects of a policy, by implementing its provisions on a representative sample of individu-
als and families, subsequently adding up the results across individual units using population
weights (Martini and Trivellato, 1997; Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2006). MSM s are essentially
forecasting devices needing a baseline simulation to predict the ‘no policy change’ situation
(Merz, 1991). This property of the model and using state-of-the art population projections,
will allow us to forecast the income distribution, and government incomes and expenditure
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under the current policy context. The simulation property consists of the evaluation of the
consequences of some change in the economic environment, often induced by a policy reform,
on each individual’s income. This will allow us to simulate the child benefit reforms, not only
under current but also under forecasted economic and demographic conditions. The results in
this paper were obtained using the microsimulation model Mefisto1.
In section 2 we describe the different steps of our methodology. Section 3 presents the
results of the population projections. Section 4 describes the forcasted inequality evolution
and its relation to demographic and economic change. Section budgetary effects and long term
outcomes of child benefit reforms. Section 5, finally, investigates how demographic change
influences the impact of a policy reform.
2 Methodology
In order to obtain the desired results, we proceed with a number of distinct steps:
1. We first make multi-state demographic projections at five-year intervals, for the next
twenty years (from 2011 up to 2031), by age, sex and household position and by age, sex
and educational attainment. The procedure is described in subsection 2.1.
2. We calibrate the EU-SILC 2008 data to the distribution of the different population sub-
groups obtained by the demographic projections. In other words, we reweigh the EU-SILC
2008 in such a way that the income data match the population forecast obtained in (1).
This procedure is called static ageing (subsection 2.2).
3. We choose a realistic scenario for economic growth to update the income data in EU-SILC
2008 for each five-year interval from 2011 to 2031 (subsection 2.3).
4. Finally, based on the re-weighted and uprated income data obtained from (2) and (3), we
estimate inequality and poverty indices for each five-year interval (subsection 2.4).
2.1 Multistate population projections
To evaluate the impact of demographic change on the income distribution, classical projections
by age and sex only are not satisfactory. In addition to these two covariates, two major
evolutions affecting income are identified in the literature: the rise in educational attainment
and a shift in household composition (Blank, 1995; Burtless, 1999; Esping-Andersen, 2007;
Kollmeyer, 2012). Using the Lipro (Lifestyle Projection) Method (Van Imhoff and Keilman,
1991), two projections for Flanders were made up to the year 2031; the first one by age, sex
and household position and the second one by age, sex and educational attainment.
Lipro-projections estimate population structures prospectively by multiplying the density
of the initially observed population state vector (baseline vector) with a transition matrix to
1Mefisto is a tax-benefit simulator based on the Euromod architecture, incorporating indirect taxes and
specific Flemish policy responsibilities.
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obtain the density of the state vector in the next period. This way the population is recursively
projected one period ahead. The transition rate matrix indicates the probability to transit
from one household position (educational level) to another. The matrix also includes death
and emigration rates from each household position (educational level) as well as births and
immigration to each household position (educational level). The initial transition rate matrix
is estimated from externally observed data. Rate matrices for consecutive projection periods are
forecasted according to plausible scenarios about the evolution of fertility, mortality, migration,
household formation processes and educational behaviour.
The population as found in the 2001 Census data served as the baseline state vector for
both projections. For the projection by household position, the population is broken down by
age and sex and 12 “Lipro household positions”: children of married and unmarried couples,
children in lone parent households, married and unmarried couples with or without children,
single households, lone parents, non-related family members, members of collective households
and a residual category2. For the projection by educational attainment level, the state vector
comprised age, sex and nine educational levels: individuals can be still in school or have finished
school with a diploma of primary education, lower secondary education (general, technical
and professional), higher secondary education (general, technical and professional) and higher
education. Initial sets of transition rates between household positions and between educational
attainment levels were estimated on the basis of linked 2001 census and Register Data. Also
birth, death and emigration rates and immigration figures were extracted from the same data
sources3.
For each consecutive five year period up to 2026-2031, the transition rates are adapted
using scenarios based on recent prognoses about the evolution of fertility, mortality and mi-
gration (Studiedienst Vlaamse Regering, 2011). We assume that the recent revival of fertility
in Flanders will continue up to the period 2016-2021 to go down again afterwards (Schockaert
and Surkyn, 2012). Life expectancy will continue to increase, a little faster for men than for
women and we assume international immigration to increase up to the 2016-2021 period. Emig-
ration increases linearly with about 20 % over the whole projection period. These hypotheses
are summarized in Table 1. Note that we assume that the household formation processes will
remain identical during the complete projection horizon. This means that the forecasted popu-
lation structure and its impact on inequality and expenditures are the result of the ageing and
the projection of household formation processes of the current population. In the case of the
educational projection, we assume a slight rise in educational retention.
The Lipro-projection model presents some clear advantages with respect to classical pro-
jections by age and sex only. First, the results are much richer. Secondly, Lipro is a fully
dynamic model where vital events and migration are differentiated by, and interact with house-
hold formation or educational processes. If for example, fertility is lower among higher educated
2The application of the Lipro-household typology to the Census and register data was discussed intensively
by Lesthaeghe et al. (1997) and will be omitted in the current paper.
3A detailed description of the projection by household position can be found in Schockaert and Surkyn
(2012).
4
DP 25 Demographic Change and Policy Indicators
P
er
io
d
2
0
0
6
−′
1
0
2
0
1
1
−′
1
5
2
0
1
6
−′
2
0
2
0
2
1
−′
2
5
2
0
2
6
−′
3
0
Fe
rt
ili
ty
bi
rt
hs
w
om
an
1.
73
1.
82
1.
76
1.
72
1.
70
Li
fe
ex
pe
ct
an
cy
ag
e(
ye
ar
s)
Fe
m
al
e
82
.7
83
.2
83
.8
84
.4
85
.0
M
al
e
76
.9
77
.7
78
.7
79
.6
80
.7
E
xt
er
na
lm
ig
ra
ti
on
ra
te
ra
te
in
ba
se
lin
e
pe
ri
od
1
1.
2
1.
4
1.
2
1
E
du
ca
ti
on
al
re
te
nt
io
n
ra
te
ra
te
in
ba
se
lin
e
pe
ri
od
1
1.
06
5
1.
13
1.
19
5
1.
25
Ta
bl
e
1:
P
ro
je
ct
io
n
sc
en
ar
io
s
5
DP 25 Demographic Change and Policy Indicators
women, than a rise in the population’s educational levels will temper total fertility rates, even
though for all educational levels alike, we considered a relative fertility increase comparable
to the one predicted by Studiedienst Vlaamse Regering (2011). In other words, important
compositional population changes mitigate the evolution of fertility, mortality and migration,
and consequently impose constraints on future population trends. Thirdly, modification in one
household position also imposes constraints on the adjustments in other household positions.
For example, if for the purpose of population projections we accept the number of same sex
couple formation to be negligible, the number of men that transit to the state of “married
couple without children” should be equal to the number of women entering this state (and vice
versa). In other words, Lipro calibrates the theoretically linked transitions. The constraints
included in the household projection are explained by Schockaert and Surkyn (2013). For the
educational projection, no constraints were used. The above properties of Lipro projections
enhance the reliability of the results by ensuring coherence in population trends.
2.2 Static ageing and calibration to obtain household weights
A conventional view on microsimulation may be summarized as follows. All microsimulation
models lie on a continuum between static tax-benefit models on the one end, and dynamic
microsimulation models on the other. The former examine the immediate impact of policy
changes and do not attempt to incorporate behavioural change; the latter are concerned with
incorporating behavioural responses as well as simulating the policy environment (Zaidi and
Rake, 2001). While this characterization looks nice at first glance, it does not hold up in
practice. First of all, it comprises two dimensions: the incorporation of behavioural responses
on the one hand, and the way the future is modelled on the other. Along the latter dimension,
we distinguish between:
1. static ageing, which involves re-weighting of a base dataset such that it corresponds with
some externally generated predictions (Cai et al., 2006), and
2. dynamic ageing, which involves simulating all relevant attributes of each individual, based
on the information from the previous period (O’Donoghue, 2001; Harding, 2007).
Let us clarify both approaches. Suppose we want to predict post-tax inequality next year.
When performing static ageing, we reweigh the current year’s sample, such that the fraction
of workers equals the projected labour market participation of next year. Information on next
year’s labour force participation is obtained from an external source. On the basis of these
new weights, we now compute the post-tax inequality. Dynamic ageing in contrast, involves
recursively updating the internal state vector of the sample.While for age, this exercise is
trivial, for other background variables such as marital status, number of children, etc... it
involves simulating new values. This is done on the basis of assumptions on fertility, migration,
education, etc. ..... Using the predicted or simulated background variables (and possibly lagged
outcomes), labour market outcomes are then simulated4, and finally, post-tax inequality can
4Note that such a prediction hinges on estimations using data from the base-year.
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be estimated.
While acknowledging that a fully dynamic approach is absolutely necessary if one wants
to model short term transitory effects, the focus in this paper is on the outcomes of long
term structural changes, that are well captured by a static reweighting procedure. Moreover,
our external data are produced by dynamic demographic projections of part of the important
background variables - age, sex, household position and education (see section 2.1). . For non-
demographic variables, most importantly labour market participation, we implicitly assume
that their correlation with the projected, demographic variables remains constant over time,
i.e. as manifested in the observed sample in the base year. Given that the set of variables
on which the projections are based, is deemed to be rich enough, the latter assumption seems
not too unrealistic and our approach seems much less depending on assumptions compared to
dynamic ageing.
An overview of weighting methods can be found in Kalton and Flores-Cervantes (2003),
keeping in mind that most of these methods are conceived to re-mediate survey non-response
(Holt and Elliot, 1991). Reweighting by a simple reweighting of cells (Kalton and Flores-
Cervantes, 2003) however, is ruled out for two reasons. First, due to data limitations, we use
two sets of demographic projections. Since these are made independently from each other,
they possibly result in conflicting reweighting factors. Although a simple solution seems to be
available by calibrating the conflicting individual weights, a second more fundamental problem
remains. In the described demographic projections, the unit of observation is the individual,
while for our distributional analysis, we prefer the household as unit of observation, since it is
the cornerstone for equivalising income. In order to marry the individual-based demographic
projections with the household-based inequality and poverty analysis, we calibrate the base
year sample using household weights, to the individual-based totals implied by the demographic
projections (Deville and Sarndal, 1992). Such a calibration procedure finds new weights as close
as possible to the old ones, such that the individual-based demographically projected totals are
respected.
The practical implementation encompasses following elements:
1. Each member, i, of household, f , is uniquely identified by the pair (f, i) and (s)he rep-
resents wf,i,t0 individuals in the population observed at time t = t0. Observation (i, f) is
a member of exactly one particular cell ch according to the projections by age, sex and
household position and of exactly one specific cell ce due to the projections by age, sex and
educational attainment. Denote the number of cells cp, by Cp, where p can denote either
h or e. In addition, denote the set of individual observations in the sample contained in
class cp by Sp;cp and the number of observations contained in this set by Np;cp , p = h, e.
2. Using the aforementioned weights wf,i,t0 , the number of individuals belonging to cell cp
in the population at the moment of observation t0, is given by
T
p;cp
t0 =
∑
(f,i)∈Sp;cp
wf,i,t0 .
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3. At each point in time, t, two weights are generated for each individual by a simple
reweighting of cells
wh;chf,i,t =
T h;cht
T h;cht0
· wf,i,t0
we;cef,i,t =
T e;cet
T e;cet0
· wf,i,t0
where T p;cpt is equal to the projected population number of individuals contained in class
cp according to the particular projection p = h, e concerned, at time t. As before, the
number of individuals belonging to cell cp according to projection p at time t, will be given
by
T
p;cp
t =
∑
(f,i)∈Sp;cp
w
p;cp
f,i,t
=
∑
(f,i)∈Sp;cp
T
p;cp
t
T
p;cp
t0
· wf,i,t0 .
Note that for a household f with Nf members, we obtain a set of 2 · Nf potentially
conflicting new weights at each time t, even if we start with weights that are constant
within each household.
4. At each point in time, t, a starting value for one unique household weight is constructed
as the weighted average of all applicable individual weights by taking them into account
inversely proportional to the number of individuals belonging to the particular class
w0f,t =
∑Nf
i=1
((
Nh;ch
)−1
wh;chf,i,t + (N
e;ce)−1we;cef,i,t
)
∑Nf
i=1
(
(Nh;ch)−1 + (N e;ce)−1
) .
We use this particular weighting scheme because cells with few observations have few
degrees of freedom to adjust to the 2 · Nf potentially conflicting totals. By giving more
weight to such potentially problematic cells in the construction of the initial family weight,
we hope to avoid convergence problems as much as possible.
5. We calibrate5 a set of unique household weights, which is done by numerically solving the
problem
wf,t = arg min
xf,t
H∑
f=1
d
(
xf,t, w
0
f,t
)
, subject to (1)
T h;cht =
∑
(f,i)∈Sh;ch
xf,t, ch = 1, . . . , Ch
T e;cet =
∑
(f,i)∈Se;ce
xf,t, ce = 1, . . . , Ce,
5The calibration was performed using the reweight command from Stata, contributed by Daniele Pacifico.
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year total converged non-converged wrong projections
# # # (% of total) % of total projected population
2006 249 243 6 (2.47%) 1.10
2008 249 243 6 (2.47%) 1.07
2011 249 242 7 (2.89%) 1.12
2016 249 243 6 (2.47%) 0.86
2021 249 243 6 (2.47%) 0.84
2026 249 242 7 (2.89%) 1.16
2031 249 241 8 (3.32%) 1.07
Table 2: Number of demographic cells and their (non)convergence
with H the number of households in the sample. That is, we look for the set of household
weights, as close as possible to the original weights w0f,t, but still respecting all population
totals. In practice, this is a hard to solve problem, which explains our particular con-
struction of the starting weights w0f,t. Each projection p class cp, contains exactly Np;cp
individuals in the observed database. In other words, there are Np;cp degrees of freedom
available to fulfil the corresponding constraint
T
p;cp
t =
∑
(f,i)∈Sp;cp
xf,t.
Constraints with a smaller number of individuals will thus be harder to fulfil, which is why
we favour them during the construction of the starting weights w0f,t, by constructing the
latter as a weighted sum of individual weights wp;cpf,i,t, with weights inversely proportional
to the number Np;cp of observations in the sample contained in the class cp.
In practice, the full optimization problem (1) never converged, but we found a solution to this
difficulty by iteratively adding more constraints, and taking the previous solution as starting
value for the next problem. If a restriction results in non-convergence, it is discarded. Upon in-
spection of the non-converged restrictions, we decided to aggregate certain neighbouring classes
ch, and, likewise some neighbouring classes ce. For example, the population projections based
on age, sex and household positions, discerned between married and unmarried couples. We
made the assumption that merging both categories, would bear little influence on the variables
of interest in this study. In addition, while classes/restrictions ch and ce with zero observations
for all projection years can readily be discarded, we merge classes for which no observations
were present in the base dataset but for which a positive number of cases were predicted in the
future, with neighbouring cells.
This merging of neighbouring classes finally resulted in the situation depicted in Table 2.
The calibration procedure successfully reconciles the two sets of demographic restrictions and
results in an error of only 1% of the projected population.
9
DP 25 Demographic Change and Policy Indicators
2.3 Economic growth
In order to obtain a realistic impression of future (equivalized) income distributions and concepts
derived thereof, such as inequality and poverty, not only demographic changes need to be taken
into account, but we need to make some assumptions concerning economic growth as well.
Clearly, economic growth is not independent of demographic changes. Indeed, if we consider
economic growth6, we can split it up into two components:
1. a demographic (or, in this context of demographic projections, endogenous) growth com-
ponent, caused by a changing distribution of individual and household characteristics
over time (considering the projections we use, the main source of this component is an
increase in educational attainment)7. Whenever a (projected) population stabilizes, this
component tends to zero.
2. an efficiency growth component, induced by the fact that people with identical individual
and household characteristics produce ever more.
Since the first component is completely determined by the demographic projections, we can
only vary productivity growth, conditional on the demographic assumptions, which we termed
efficiency growth. In the remainder of this paper we assume that the efficiency growth amounts
to a yearly real-term increase of 1%.
In addition, the following assumptions are made:
• economic growth is proportionally shared among the factors of production, which entails
that (self-)employment income and income from capital have the same growth rate.
• benefits grow according to the assumptions described in Dekkers et al. (2013): the min-
imum income will grow at an annual rate of 1% in real terms, all other benefits at 0.5%.
To ensure that we do not overestimate inequality, we allow pensions to grow with the efficiency
growth rate. Let us justify the pension growth rate by providing an example. Consider a
pensioner in the observed sample who retired five years prior to observation at time t0. In
the philosophy of the reweighting methodology, this observation will represent a number of
pensioners at time t1, who will have retired in t1 − 5. Exact calculation of their pension would
involve calculating the observations last wage at t0−5, applying the observed real wage growth
between t0 − 5 and t0, applying the hypothesized real wage growth between t0 and t1 − 5, and
finally, applying an hypothesized real pension growth between t1 − 5 and t1. Simply uprating
pensions by the hypothesized real wage growth rate will produce accurate results if
1. real pension growth rates between t1 − 5 and t1 are identical to those between t0 − 5 and
t0.
6Making abstraction of phenomena like job title erosion, etc.
7Assuming the increasingly educated are fully absorbed by the labour market, i.e. there is no involuntary
unemployment among the higher educated
10
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2. the real wage growth rate between t0 − 5 and t0 was close to the hypothesised real wage
growth rate.
It seems reasonable to make assumptions concerning incomes in terms of the efficiency growth
rate, since collective wage agreements pertain to individual increases in wages. Assuming the
educational attainment of one firm, or even a whole sector of the economy, remains quite stable
over time, wage increases will be accorded conditional on age and education of employees.
Likewise, an increase in benefits is stated as a percentage increase of the individual’s bene-
fit. Consequently, wage and benefit rises seem not directly connected with any demographic
evolution. The demographic growth component is not observed by individual firms, but only
appears ex-post at the aggregate level.
The resulting factors by which incomes and pensions are uprated are given in Table 3. As
year factor
2011 1.030
2016 1.083
2021 1.138
2026 1.196
2031 1.257
Table 3: Uprate factors
mentioned above, this represents only the efficiency growth component of the total economic
growth, the second component arising from the fact that increasingly educated cohorts grow
older. The combined effect of efficiency growth and growth induced by demographic change
is depicted in Figure 1. It is obtained by calculating the growth rate of aggregated primary
income per capita, under the combined demographic and economic assumptions, which should
be a close proxy to projected per capita economic growth. The total growth rate gradually
decreases to the annual efficiency growth rate of 1%. Although this boundary is not fully
reached, the projected evolution is consistent with what we theoretically expect: once we
reach a stable population (keeping boundary conditions on fertility, migration, . . . constant),
economic growth will settle at the level of what we termed the efficiency growth component.
11
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Figure 1: The macro-economic growth rate resulting from both efficiency and demographic
growth.
2.4 Measuring inequality and poverty
2.4.1 Inequality indexes
We calculate two inequality indices: the Gini coefficient and the Theil index. For some con-
tinuous (income) distribution F with mean µF , the Gini coefficient is formally defined by
GF = −1 + 2
ˆ ∞
0
xF (x) dF (x)
µF
, (2)
where the variable x represents equivalized net income of individual i. The equivalized income
is obtained by dividing total net household income by an equivalence scale, which takes into
account differences in household size. It could be considered as the amount of income a single
person household would have to earn to obtain a comparable welfare level. In this paper, we
use the OECD equivalence scale, which gives full weight to the first household member, 0.5
to subsequent adults and 0.3 to each child. The value of the Gini coefficient ranges from 0 at
complete income equality (everybody earns the same amount) to 1 when inequality is maximal
(only one individual earns total income). If we only have a sample at our disposal, the Gini
coefficient can be estimated by
GˆF = 1
N (N − 1)
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
‖xi − xj‖
µ
,
with xi representing a realisation of x.
The Theil index8 is a competing inequality measure. It is given by
TF =
ˆ ∞
0
x
µF
ln
(
x
µF
)
dF (x) . (3)
It ranges from 0 at complete income equality (everybody earns the same amount) to lnN , when
8It is a member of the class of generalized entropy measures.
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inequality is maximal (only one individual earns total income). It is measured by
TˆF = N
−1
N∑
i=1
xi
x¯
ln
(
xi
x¯
)
.
The Gini index is a popular measure used in many inequality studies, in the first place for its
clear interpretation. One main advantage of the Theil index is its sub-group decomposability,
i.e.
TF = TB +
G∑
g=1
qg · TFg , (4)
where g = 1, . . . , G constitutes a partition of the population9, qg is the equivalized income share
of subgroup g, TFg is the Theil index of sub-group g and TB is the between group Theil index.
It is calculated by attributing every individual the group-mean equivalized income µFg .
In the context of analysing the influence of change in the population composition on the
income distribution, this property of the Theil is helpful. We use it to analyse the contribution
of specific changes in the prevalence of population categories, for example, the increase of single
headed households or individuals with higher education, to the forecasted changes in inequality.
This contribution can be derived from the second part of the formula
∑G
g=1 qg · TFg , since the
income share is related to the sub-group population share.
2.4.2 Poverty
(Foster et al., 1984) introduced the family of poverty indices
P FGT (F | z, α) =
ˆ ∞
0
[
max
(
1− x
z
, 0
)]α
f (x) dx,
known as the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke class of poverty measures, where, as before, the variable
x represents equivalized net household income, f (x) its density function and with z the poverty
line or poverty threshold. In this paper, we use a relative poverty line, defined as 60% of the
median equivalized income of the Flemish population. Note that the poverty line varies over
time. P FGT (F | z, 1) is the normalized poverty gap10. The (non-normalized) poverty gap per
poor person is equal to the difference between the individual’s income and the poverty line
divided by the poverty rate. It is an indicator of the severity of poverty.
A key advantage of the FGT class of poverty indices is its subgroup decomposability, i.e.
P FGT (F | z, α) =
K∑
k=1
pkP
FGT (Fk | z, α) ,
with pk the fraction of the population belonging to subgroup k and Fk the income distribu-
tion within subgroup k. As in the case of the Theil decomposition, we will use the poverty
9Under a partition, every individual belongs to exactly one subgroup.
10The poverty gap is also known as the poverty deficit.
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decomposition to gain insight in the impact of specific shifts in the population composition on
poverty.
The EU-2020 “At Risk Of Poverty or social Exclusion” (AROPE ) indicator (Antuofermo
and Di Meglio, 2012) is a composite indicator defined as the share of the population for which
at least one of the following conditions holds:
1. being at risk of poverty ;
2. living in a situation of severe material deprivation;
3. living in a household characterised by a very low work intensity.
Being at risk of poverty means that the equivalized net income of the household falls below the
poverty threshold, as defined above. A household is severely materially deprived if it cannot
afford four or more out of the nine following items: (1) timely payment of mortgage or rent,
utility bills, hire purchase instalments or other types of loans; (2) one week’s annual holiday
away from home; (3) a meal with meat, chicken, fish (or vegetarian equivalent) every second
day; (4) unexpected financial expenses; (5) a telephone (including mobile phone); (6) a colour
TV; (7) a washing machine; (8) a car; (9) heating to keep the home adequately warm.
A person is defined to be of working age if he is aged between 18 and 59 years, excluding
students between 18 and 24 years old. For each household the number of full-time equivalent
months worked by all persons of working age is divided by total number of months that could
theoretically have been worked by the same household members.If the obtained number falls
below 20%, the households is considered to have a very low work intensity.
3 Demographic trends
During the second half of the last century, intense modifications in family formation and dis-
solution were observed (Lesthaeghe et al., 1997): a postponement of first marriage, a reduction
of marriage intensity and an increment in divorce rates. These evolutions in combination with
the endurance of fertility decline and the increase of life expectancy, will induce a profound
change in Flanders´ demographic structure over the next twenty years.
Figure 2 shows the population distribution by age and sex in 2011 and the projection result
for 2031. As the baby-boom generations at working and reproductive age in 2011 grow older,
the bottom of the pyramid shrinks and the top becomes heavier. Parallel, this ageing process
gives rise to changes in the population’s household composition as the younger generations of
2011 grow older and their family formation behaviour is reflected in successive age groups in
each subsequent projection year. This is demonstrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3 depicts the proportional distribution of household positions by age for each five
year projection period between 2011 and 2031. On the x-axes are represented the five-year age
groups and on the y-axes the proportion of individuals from each age group in single headed
households and in couples with and without children. Each curve, from light to dark grey, than
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Figure 2: Population pyramid 2011 - 2031
represents a consecutive projection year. Panel (a) and panel (b) correspond to women and
men respectively. A first important evolution is the decrease of the share of individuals that
live in couples with children and a concentration of parenthood around younger ages. These
evolutions are related to the decrease and postponement of couple formation and to fertility
decline leading to a shorter total time span that children are present at their parent’s household.
Higher divorce rates add to this evolution and also explain the decreasing prevalence of couples
without children at more advanced adult age. However, among the elderly population, above the
age of 75 for women and 85 for men, the prevalence of individuals living in a couple increases
in time. This is easily understood as the result of growing partner’s survival rates since we
projected women’s and especially men’s life expectancy to grow. The decrease over time of
couples results in the rise of single-headed households, most eminent between the age of 40 and
7011.
Figure 4 depicts the proportional distribution by age of individuals with only primary edu-
cation or less, lower and higher secondary education and higher education for each five year
projection period between 2011 and 2031. Panel (a) and panel (b) represent the distribution
for women and men respectively. The Figure shows that parallel to ageing and changes in
household position, for all age groups and the two sexes, we foresee a considerable advance-
ment in educational attainment. That is, for each age group the share of the population with
higher secondary and higher education becomes larger in time. This process is almost entirely
due to the ageing of the population as from each projection year to the next, the educational
profile of the younger generations is progressively spread to all ages. Therefore, in the first part
of the projection period, especially the 40 − 64-age group’s educational attainment increases;
in the second half of the projection period, the 65+ educational attainment rises most while
below 60, practically no change is observed any more. Within the population under the age of
35, practically no change is observed since we assumed only minor adaptations in educational
11Note that, by age and for each projection year, the prevalence of female single headed households progress-
ively outgrows the prevalence of male single headed households. The sex differences in life expectancy and the
fact that women on average are younger than their partner, leads to a higher proportion of female than male
headed households. At the end of the life course, the proportion of single headed households decreases, as people
move to a collective household.
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(a) Couples with children
(b) Couples without children
(c) Single headed households
Figure 3: Population by age, sex and Lipro position
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behaviour (cf. Table 1). Consequently, in the long run, an equalizing tendency between gener-
ations and gender is observed. The following comparison demonstrates this tendency: in 2011,
the part of the population having at least a higher secondary degree below the age of 40 was
about 80% while this was only the case for about 22% of the group above 65. In 2031 80% of
the whole population under 65 will have a higher secondary degree, and this is also the case for
almost 60% of the +65 group. Furthermore, in 2011, the younger generations of women had
already suppurated the level of the men; in 2031 this will be the case for all age groups, except
the most advanced ones.
4 Inequality and poverty effects
4.1 Demographic and efficiency growth effects on inequality and poverty
evolutions
In this section we depict the forecasted change in income distribution, using the Gini and Theil
indexes (Figure 5) for describing the overall inequality changes. In addition, the poverty rate,
poverty gap, and the AROPE indicators (Figures 6 and 7) focus on the evolution of the lower
tail of the income distribution. The curve called “total predicted effect” traces the evolution
of each indicator when we carry out projections as described in section 2. Note that the
main interpretation of such a curve should be comparative to the year 2008, represented by a
horizontal grey line.
We decompose this projection into its constituent components, following the Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition method (see section 1). The “efficiency growth effect” is obtained by keeping
the population identical to its 2008 distribution, but attributing every individual an income
increase as described in subsection 2.3. The “demographic effect” results from the projected
evolution in population composition, but keeping real incomes constant at their 2008 level.
Note that the total effect is not always the sum of the two partial effects, but a sometimes quite
important interaction effect induces some degree of non-linearity.
Both the temporal evolution and the decomposition into a demographic and an efficiency
growth effect of the Gini and the Theil indices are similar (see Figure 5). The overall inequality
change is mainly driven by the demographic component with a rather small efficiency growth
effect added to it.
Inequality peaks around 2021 and reaches a level comparable to 2008 in 2031. Note however
that the predicted change is quiet small. At its peak in 2021, the Gini coefficient has only
increased 0.007 points in absolute terms (which corresponds with roughly 3%) above its initial
level of 0.211. Of this change, about 86% is due to demographic changes and only 14% to
the efficiency growth effect. However, in 2031, the Gini coefficient is only 0.002 points (1%)
above its initial level, with 100% of the increase explained by the efficiency growth effect12.
The Theil index follows a similar pattern, with a maximal increase of 0.008 points (9%). While
12Compare this with the results of Blank (2011, ch.4, p.94), who only attributes a mere 15% of the 1979−2007
rise in the US Gini coefficient for total income to demographic changes.
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Figure 4: population and educational attainment by age and sex
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the efficiency growth effect increases inequality due to the different growth rates between gross
wages and the different types of benefits, we refer to refer to sub section 4.2 for a detailed
analysis of the effect of demographic changes on inequality.
(a) Gini coefficient (b) Theil index
Figure 5: Inequality indices
The projection of the poverty rate and the AROPE indicators are depicted in Figures 6a
and 7. From 2011 onwards, both indicators steadily decrease from a maximum of about 13.5%
and 10% to 11.5% and 7.3% respectively. The number of people in poverty (Figure 6b) follows
a similar pattern. This is the result of a efficiency growth effect, reinforced after 2016 by a
demographic effect13. In contrast with the poverty rate, the average poverty gap (Figure 8a)
systematically increases from 300e to about 340e. In other words, despite the decrease in
poverty risk, for those in poverty, the situation becomes more severe. The aggregate poverty
gap, which represents the cost to eradicate poverty in Flanders, shows the pattern of the poverty
rate: an initial increase followed by a decrease (Figure 8b).
Finally, the child poverty rate and the number of children in poverty appear in Figure 9.
We observe an almost constant efficiency growth effect that, combined with a monotonously
increasing population-effect, results in an total predicted effect that peaks in 2016 at 8% and
83000 poor children. Afterwards, both indicators decline.
In short, inequality rises during the first decade of the projection period and decreases
afterwards. Poverty as well witnesses an increase, but for a shorter period of time. Further-
more, overall inequality changes seem mostly driven by demographic factors, while the poverty
evolution in addition strongly depends on the forecasted economic factors.
4.2 Understanding the effect of population change
Up till now, we established the effect of the joint forecasted population changes as compared to
efficiency growth effects. In this section, we break down the population effect in order to gain
13Note that the joint effect is larger than the sum of the demographic and efficiency growth effect, indicating
an important interaction between both evolutions
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(a) Relative poverty rate (b) People in poverty
Figure 6: Overall poverty
Figure 7: Percentage of the population at risk of poverty or social exclusion
(a) Monthly poverty gap per poor household (b) Total yearly poverty gap
Figure 8: Poverty gap
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(a) Child poverty rate (b) Children in poverty
Figure 9: Child poverty
insight into the way population change affects inequality. Some shifts in the prevalence of par-
ticular sub-groups described in Section 3 give some suggestions, but evolutions are intertwined
and/or imply contradictory effects, rendering simple inference difficult.
Let’s take first the example of ageing. On the one hand, ageing implies an increase of the
population above the age of 65, frequently pensioners at the bottom of the income distribution.
On the other hand, ageing also implies an increase in life expectancy, and couples´ longer
survival has a positive effect on household income: in 2031, women will depend less on a
widower’s pension and also, with the increase in education and female labour force participation,
households will often have two pensions or combine a pension with (the younger woman’s)
income from wages. Consequently, the effect of ageing on the income distribution is far from
clear.
The same counts for the growth in educational attainment, leading in the first place to
higher wages and labour force participation. Consequently, combined with assortative mating,
income disparity between highly educated working couples on the one hand, and lowly educated
couples with low work intensity or single headed households on the other, increases (Esping-
Andersen, 2007). However, the larger the group of educated and the lower educational disparity,
the smaller the role this factor will play in the determination of income inequality. In the long
run, we well might expect the rise in educational attainment to temper inequality.
Figures 10-11 show the decomposition of the population effect on the evolution of the Theil
index (cf. Figure 5b) by age and educational attainment (Figure 10) and by age and household
position (Figure 11). This decomposition method was explained in Equation (4) of Subsection
2.4. Note that students are not included in this analysis and we also exclude the age groups
below 25, over-represented among students. The left side of the figures analyses the overall
inequality reduction between the beginning and the end of the projection period (2011 versus
2031) observed on Figure 5b. The right side of the figures is restricted to the period of temporal
inequality increase between 2011 and 2021.
The first bar at the left depicts the change in the between-groups Theil. The other bars
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indicate each population group’s contribution to the overall inequality change. This contribu-
tion depends on the inequality evolution within each group and the group’s share of the total
population’s income, represented in light and dark grey bars respectively (cf. Equation (4)).
The size of the bar indicates the size of contribution to inequality change; upward means a
positive impact, downward a negative one. Note that the income share of each group plays the
most important role, while within-group shifts have mostly only modest effects. Since we work
under the assumption of “no economic change”, the within-group inequality change is only due
to modifications in the unobserved variable composition (and the sex composition) related to
the forecasted population change. Under the same assumption, it is clear that changes in the
income share are largely driven by changes in the population; a change in the prevalence of a
population category provokes an income share change in the same direction. This way we can
directly link the results with the population change described in Section 3.
The left side of Figure 10 indicates that the overall decrease in inequality between 2011 and
2031 is due to a reduction of between-group inequality and to the decrease in income share
of the population with no or only primary education. The latter process is related to the
general increase in educational attainment depicted in Figure 4 in subsection 3. The reduction
of between-group inequality can easily be understood through the attenuation of generational
differences in education. In contrast, Figure 10 also shows that the increase of the income
share of individuals over 55 with secondary or higher education, increases inequality. In other
words, ageing and the subsequent growth of the elderly population increases inequality, despite
their higher educational attainment. This effect is however not enough to offset the impact
of the reduction in the lowest educational levels combined with the decrease in between-group
inequality. The right side of Figure 10, focussing on the first part of the projection period
showing a short-term increase of inequality, reveals similar subgroup influences. Nevertheless,
the impact on inequality of ageing outgrows that of educational attainment growth and between-
group inequality reduction. Consequently, Figure 5b showed an increase of inequality between
2011 and 2021.
Figure 11 decomposing the Theil by age and household position also reveals that the growth
of the elderly population’s income share positively contributes to the Theil, weather living in
a couple or in single-headed households. The decrease of the adult population younger than
55 living in couples with children, has a negative impact on inequality. Note that the within-
group inequality among many couples of the same age group increases, as well as the between-
group inequality between 2011 and 2021. This can be understood by the fact that educational
growth, especially at the beginning of the projection period, increasingly differentiates among
individuals in similar household positions. This process is more evident in couples than single
headed households due to larger effect of education on the income growth of double-income
households. Over the total observation period, the direction of the contribution of each group’s
within group inequality change remains the same as during the period prior to 2021, but the
impact of couples without children and single headed households is not large enough any more
to counteract the effect of the changes in couples with children and the between-group inequality
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decrease.
Figure 12: Decomposition of poverty change by age and educational attainment
Figures 12-13 show the decomposition of the declining poverty trend between 2011 and
2031 (cf. Figure 6a). Figure 12 refers to the decomposition by age and educational attainment;
Figure 13 to the decomposition by household position. The bars indicate each population
group’s contribution to the overall poverty change, depending on the within-group poverty
and the population share of each group, represented in light and dark grey bars respectively
(cf. Equation (4)). The size of the bar indicates the size of contribution to inequality change;
upward means a positive impact, downward a negative one. Note that the student population
and the population below the age of 25 were excluded.
Figure 12 shows that the poverty reduction observed in Figure 6a is closely related with
educational changes. The decrease of the population share with only or less than primary
education contributes to a large extent to the poverty decrease witnessed between 2011 and
2031. Among the lowly educated of more advanced age, the population share change is smal-
ler due to the ageing of the population. We observe however a prominent reduction in their
poverty levels, leading to an important overall contribution to poverty reduction. At higher
educational levels (secondary and higher education), ageing increases poverty, despite the de-
crease of poverty levels within the elderly population. Note that among younger age groups,
the within-group poverty increases, except among individuals with higher education. Figure 13
shows that the reduction of poverty within the elderly population is most pronounced among
couples without children, but is also witnessed among single headed households. The increase
of poverty among the younger population concentrates within couples with children. The de-
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Figure 13: Decomposition of poverty change by age and household position
crease of couples without children (cf. Figure 3) counterbalances this tendency, leading to a
rather modest joint effect on poverty change. Being single headed households among the lower
income groups and couples without children among the higher ones, the increasing share of the
former and decreasing share of the latter, also counteracts the negative evolution of the total
poverty rate.
4.3 Budgetary effects
In Figure 14 we present the projected evolution of payments made to all levels of government
and benefits received from all levels of government by Flemish households, expressed as a
percentage of aggregated gross incomes. These numbers are generated by the MSM Mefisto,
which models the Belgian tax-benefit system. We decompose the “total predicted effect” into
an “efficiency growth effect”, by increasing each individual’s income, keeping the population
structure identical to the 2008 structure, and a “population effect”, by changing the population
structure to match the population forecasts, but keeping constant individuals’ income in real
terms (cf. section 4).
Figure 14a depicts the total tax burden, which consists of total income taxes and social
security contributions. Demographic changes have only a moderate effect on the tax burden,
increasing it by around 1% – frome 54.5% to 55.5% – between 2008 and 2031, again in percentage
of total gross income. In contrast, the efficiency growth effect induces an almost linear increase
in taxes from 54.5% in 2008 to 62% in 2031. This tax increase is mainly caused by increasing
26
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(a) Evolution of income taxes and social security contribu-
tions as a percentage of total income
(b) Evolution of all social security payments received as a
percentage of total income
(c) Net yearly payments made
Figure 14: Budgetary effects of demographic evolution and assumed growth rate.
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real wages which are faced with a tax system assumed to be constant in real terms, resulting
in increasing real tax rates. The evolution of the total predicted effect climbs slightly above
the efficiency growth effect. Note that, in general, the total effect, measured as the difference
at a certain point in time with the year 2008, is not always the sum of the two partial effects,
measured similarly, but a sometimes quiet important interaction effect induces some degree
of non-linearity. For example, the difference between the total predicted effect on taxes in
2031 and the horizontal line marking the level of taxes in 2008, is larger than the sum of the
demographic and the efficiency growth effects in Figure 14a.
(a) Income tax (b) Social security contributions
Figure 15: Evolution of income taxes and social security contributions
Figure 15 breaks down the total tax burden into its constituent components income tax
(Figure 15a) and social security contributions (Figure 15b). Income tax is predicted to rise
almost linearly from 22.5% of total gross income in 2008 to 29% in 2031. About two thirds is
induced by the efficiency growth effect, while the remaining increase of one third follows mainly
from the endogenous growth due to increasing educational levels. Social security contributions
fall below their initial level of 32.2% of total gross income until 2021, but climb to 32.5% in
2031. This last evolution is the combined effect of a linearly increasing efficiency growth effect
with a negative demographic effect, which stabilizes around −0.7% after 2021.
In Figure 14b, the dependent variable is the sum of child benefits, minimum guaranteed
income, unemployment benefits and pensions (again expressed as a percentage of aggregated
gross incomes). While the efficiency growth effect on total received benefits decreases with
about 1%, the total increase from 29% to 40% is mainly driven by the demographic effect.
Breaking down all benefits received into their four components (Figure 16), the bulk (80% of
total benefits) consists of pensions, with the remainder about equally divided between child
(10.3%) and unemployment benefits (9.4%) in 2008. In 2031, however, the share of pensions
has increased to 85% of total benefits at the expense of the unemployment benefits (6%), and
with child benefits slightly decreasing to 9% of total benefits.
The difference between figures 14a and 14b, is given in sub-figure 14c. It could be considered
as a measure of the size of government pur sang, i.e. that part of revenues which is not
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(a) Child support (b) Minimum income
(c) Unemployment benefits (d) Pensions
Figure 16: Evolution of different types of benefits received
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redistributed right away. Here the two partial effects oppose each other, resulting in a steady
decrease of the total effect from 25% to 20%. Remarkably, the total predicted size of government
expenses, expressed per capita (instead of relating it to total gross income) is roughly the same
in 2031 as in 2008. This means that the non-redistributive tasks of the aggregated government,
such as law enforcement, infrastructure, education and health care, for example, can remain at
their 2008 level, in real terms, per capita. In other words, under the assumed growth scenario
and keeping the tax-benefit system constant in real terms, in twenty years time the aggregated
collective sector governing the Flemish population will be able to provide the same level of
services and collective goods per capita as today, despite the increasing share of pensions in
total income from 23% in 2008 to 34% in 2031 (see Figure 16d).
Note that when we would consider the social security system separately, and compare be-
nefits received (Figure 14b) with contributions made (Figure 15b), we can not help but notice
that the surplus of about 3% (32.25% contributions paid by households obtained from Figure
15b minus 29.25% benefits received by households obtained from Figure 14b) in 2008, is turned
into a deficit of 6.5% (32.5% contributions paid minus 39% benefits received) in 2031 (all quant-
ities measured as percentage of aggregate gross income). This in turn could have lead us raise
alarmist warnings about the sustainability of pensions. Indeed, in a steady state, i.e. without
any demographical or other transition, any system can only be sustainable, if it complies to a
budget constraint. In this respect, two remarks are in order:
1. The ageing of the population is a transitory effect, hence any ceteris paribus steady state
reasoning seems a priori overly simplistic.
2. Notice the use of the word system, without the “social security” qualifier.
Indeed, when considering the complete collective sector, our exercise shows that the in-
creased income taxes ensuing from only a moderate growth will pay for the increased
volume of pensions, while at the same time leaving everyone better off in real terms,
compared to the present situation. As the population approaches a new steady state,
the fraction of taxes needed to subsidize the social security system can be brought down
again.
5 Changing the child benefits
Recently, some political parties started to formulate reservations regarding the actual distri-
bution of benefits among the population. In the present child benefit system, the marginal
allowance increases with the child’s rank, thus encouraging more strongly larger families. This
principle has been called into question and a flat rate has been advocated. In addition, some
proposals increase the extra allowance given to parents with a sufficiently low income to be
eligible for social assistance.
We will now not only simulate such a reform, investigating its distributional effects, but we
will also evaluate the impact that the demographic evolution can have on the effects of such a
policy change.
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5.1 Reform
The actual reform we simulate consists of two parts:
1. A fixed base allowance of 143.5e per child, which replaces the current age and rank-
dependent allowance. This base allowance constitutes 90% of the budget for child allow-
ances.
2. An extra allowance of 70e per child, accorded to single parents and parents with a
sufficiently low income to be eligible for social assistance.
The amounts are chosen such that the extra allowance for parents with a sufficiently low income
is about 50% of the base allowance and such that the reform is budget neutral : the total amount
spent on child benefits post-reform remains identical to the amount spent pre-reform.
5.2 Results
Figure 17 reports the fraction of winners and losers (Figure 17a) and the average net amount
gained, both in absolute and relative terms (Figure 17b), per decile of the equivalized baseline
income. In general, the number of winners decreases with time and the number of losers
increases or stays constant. The highest fractions of losers are situated in decile 4 and 5, while
the highest fraction of winners lie in deciles 6 to 8. Losers outnumber winners only in decile
4. The average net gain is close to zero or negative across the income distribution. It stays
constant or decreases over time, except in decile 6. The average net gain is lowest in deciles
4− 5 and 7− 8.
Figure 18 depicts the projected evolution of the child poverty rate and the number of
children in poverty. Without policy reform, the child poverty rate would steadily decline to
6.8% in 2031, after reaching a peak of about 7.8% in 2016. The simulated reform, however,
while initially causing a slight increase of the child poverty rate, has a favourable effect up to
about 2020. Afterwards, the child poverty rates of baseline and reform are very close, but in
2031 the child poverty rate lies about 1% above the baseline. The evolution of the absolute
number of children in poverty is similar.
Figure 19 shows the small but consistently positive effect of the policy reform on income
inequality, represented by the Gini coefficient.
Figure (20) traces the budgetary effect of both the baseline and the reform over time.
Whereas in the base-year 2008, the reform was budget-neutral by construction, it will constitute
savings of about 500 millione by 2031. This is of course another look at the same information
contained in Figure 17: on average people lose by this reform.
6 Conclusions
Under the assumptions of our projections, inequality exhibits a non-monotonous pattern over
time, reaching a maximum around 2020. Poverty steadily declines after 2011. Demographics
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(a) The percentage of winners and losers within each income decile
(b) The average net gain per decile both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the average disposable income
per decile
Figure 17: Situation of the gains and losses in the income distribution.
(a) Fraction of children ≤ 14y at risk of poverty. (b) Absolute number of children ≤ 14y at risk of poverty.
Figure 18: Projected evolution of child poverty measures.
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Figure 19: Projected evolution of inequality.
Figure 20: Total amount spent on child benefits per annum
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also play a mayor role in the evolution of public finances. On the revenue side, income taxes
increase from 22% to almost 30% of gross income earned by all families. This effect is caused
by the tax brackets we assumed constant in real terms. On the expense side, pensions increase
from 23% to 34% of gross income earned by all families. However, this spectacular increase in
pension volume is completely paid by the modest growth we assume and by keeping the tax
system constant in real terms. These results are obtained without altering the retirement age,
nor the level of pensions. Which is not to say that no policy changes will be needed to keep
the social security system sustainable. In particular, we made no explicit assumptions about
the growth of the health benefit expenses.
Most of the observed phenomena can be understood by studying underlying demographic
evolutions. The first and most important evolution, is, without any doubt, the ageing of the
population, causing an increasing fraction to become pensioner and at the same time increasing
inequality. A second evolution is the increasing educational level of those same ageing baby-
boomers, causing incomes and participation rates of each cohort to slightly increase compared to
previous ones. In addition, as the population ages, educational levels of all generations increase
and the difference between generations attenuates. This effect somewhat counterbalances the
ageing effect. The rest of the observed evolutions can be understood mainly in terms of relative
shifts between different family types, as was analysed in detail in subsection 4.2.
The rise in inequality during the first part of the projection period is associated with an
increase of between group income differences and with the increase of single-headed households
to the detriment of couples without children among adults of advanced age (55-75). After 2021,
these groups play a smaller role in inequality change. The decrease of couples with children
tempers the inequality increase during the first period of the projection and reinforces the
inequality decline related to the strong decrease of between group inequality after 2021.
The increase of single-headed households to the detriment of couples without children among
adults of advanced age (55− 75) increases inequality; the decrease of the prevalence of couples
with children tends to decrease inequality. In section 3, it was shown that as the population
ages, educational levels of all generations increase and the difference between generations atten-
uates. The decrease of low educational levels decreases inequality. Ageing, despite of increased
educational levels of the elderly population, increases inequality.
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A A Lipro-typology construction for EU-SILC
The first step of the reweighting procedure consists of knowing for each individual, its age, sex
and household position. The former two variables are readily available in the EU-SILC ; house-
hold position however is not. In this section we explain how we constructed a Lipro household
typology within the EU-SILC dataset. The EU-SILC questionnaire identifies the relationships
of parenthood and partnership between all household members. Figure 21 shows an extract of
the Belgian EU-SILC questionnaire on the relationships among household members. Based on
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Figure 21: The EU-SILC questionnaire on relationships among household members
Note: “voorgedrukt” and “voorg” means that the information is taken directly from the National
Register. The interviewer only verifies it.
information directly from the National Register, in column 2 and 3, the names of each house-
hold member are printed. In column 21 to 24, the interviewer enters the line number (column
1) corresponding to the father, mother, spouse or partner of each individual.
To assign a Lipro household position to each individual in the database, we started with the
basic rules presented in Table 4. In the case of nuclear families, the application of the above rules
is not problematic. In the case of extended families, additional restrictions become necessary.
When the extended family involves grandparents, parents and children, the grandparents are
assigned the MAR+ or UNM+ category. This implies that the second generation is classified
as CMAR or CUNM and the grandchildren will be OTHR/NFR. The same rule is applied if
there is only one grandparent present; the first generation is H1PA, the second C1PA and the
grandchildren OTHR/NFR. This choice has implications for the population structure. Most
grandparents are married couples, while this is less the case for the second generation among
which consensual unions are more accepted. If we had the MAR+ of UNM+ categories to the
second generation, more individuals would have been UNM+.
To verify the compatibility of the EU-SILC Lipro typology and the Census typology, we
compare the population structure by age, sex and household position in EU-SILC (2008) and
in the results of the population projection. The continuous lines in represent the distribution by
age, sex and Lipro-household position for 2008 resulting from the weighted average of the 2006
Register data used in the projection and the projected population for 2011. The dotted lines
show the distribution from the EU-SILC data, taking into account the original weights. Since
both distributions refer to the same population, they should be identical. However, we observe
some important discrepancies. In the case of children’s household positions, the population
distribution by age and sex in EU-SILC closely follows the one of the Projection (Figure 22).
There are a little less C1PA children of young age and slightly more CUNM children in EU-
SILC. Also the proportion of singles (SING) and lone parents (H1PA) seems to be slightly
underestimated in the EU-SILC with respect to the projection, while the part of married men
and women with or without children (MAR0 and MAR+) is somewhat higher (Figure 23).
The largest difference however is found among the UNM0 and UNM+ categories for which
the EU-SILC shows a considerable larger part of the young adult population. Several processes
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Figure 22: Comparison of the population distribution by age and sex in EU-SILC and the
projection, SING, MAR0, MAR+.
are at the basis of these divergences. The underestimation of singles, and single parents and
their children in the EU-SILC most probably reveals a sampling error not entirely corrected
by the weights; drop-out and non-response is higher among individuals living alone (or alone
with children) than among larger households. The larger proportion of UNM0 and UNM+
in EU-SILC than in the Projection Results is more puzzling. In the Census and Register
data used for the projections, the Lipro-household position is defined using the relationship of
each member with the household head. While in the EU-SILC data, the unmarried couple
is always defined as UNM0 or UNM+, this is not the case in the Projection Results, where
another member can take the role of the household head. More important yet is the absence of
a clear manner to identify consensual unions in Census and Register data; when the household
head is not married, no relationship is defined. To identify the UNM0 and UNM+ individuals,
Deboosere et al. (2009) therefore proposed that individuals of the opposite sex and without
family relation to the household head are a potential partner. However, this person should
have an age difference of at least 15 years to all other non-family related members. This last
restriction may lead to an underestimation of consensual unions.
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Figure 23: Comparison of the population distribution by age and sex in EU-SILC and the
projection, UNM0, UNM+, H1PA.
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